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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The case in controversy arises under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (2004), commonly re-
ferred to as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which is a federal
statute. Congress granted the federal courts statutory authority
to hear federal question cases which include questions that arise
under federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2004). This is an appeal
of right taken from a final judgment by a federal district court.
Therefore, this court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether Congress intended to allow States, such as New
Union, to intervene as a matter of right in CWA enforcement
actions.
II. Whether Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc. gave
adequate notice by providing sufficient information to inform
Capitol City of its alleged CWA violation.
III. Whether the CWA preempts State authority to allocate
water despite the statute's express reservation of that power for
States.
IV. Whether the CWA applies to an isolated, nonnavigable, in-
trastate river used wholly to supply water to Capitol City.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 1, 2004, Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc.,
("FSSC") gave notice of its intent to sue Capitol City, New Union,
pursuant to the CWA's citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251,
1365. (R. at 3.) The notice alleged that Capitol City violated sec-
tion 1311(a) of the CWA because its diversion of water from the
Torpid River to the Rapid River added silt, a pollutant, into navi-
gable water without a permit from August 15, 2003 until June 1,
2004. (R. at 3.) After waiting the jurisdictional 60 days, FSSC, on
behalf of its members, Nelson Spinner ("Spinner") and Newton
Creel ("Creel"), brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of New Union on August 1, 2003. (R. at 3.)
Specifically, FSSC contended that Capitol City violated section
13 11(a) of the CWA by discharging suspended and settleable solids
from the Torpid Aqueduct into the Rapid River from August 15,




The State of New Union filed a motion to intervene by right
under section 1365(c)(2) of the CWA. (R. at 4.) The district court
granted the motion, concluding that the CWA treats States and
the United States in the same manner for citizen suit intervention
purposes. (R. at 5.) Capitol City then filed a motion for summary
judgment on several grounds, which the court granted in its en-
tirety. (R. at 4-5.) First, the court held that FSSC failed to give
proper notice of its intent to sue under section 1365(b)(1)(A) of the
CWA. (R. at 5-7). Second, the court held that Capitol City's diver-
sion from the Torpid River to the Rapid River does not add pollu-
tants to a navigable water in violation of section 1311(a) of the
CWA because the Rapid River does not fall within the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's ("EPA") definition of "navigable wa-
ters." (R. at 7-9.) Lastly, the court ruled that the CWA does not
govern Capitol City's diversion because New Union's issuance of a
permit authorizing Capitol City to divert water is a state water
use allocation that, under section 1251(g) of the CWA, precluded
what otherwise might be a section 1311(a) violation. (R. at 10.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Capitol City is located on the dry south slope of the Front
Mountains in the state of New Union. (R. at 3.) Because of its dry
location, Capitol City operates a water acquisition program to
meet the water supply demands of its large citizenry and busi-
nesses. (R. at 3.) Capitol City acquires most of its water from the
Torpid River, located on the wet north slope of the Front Moun-
tains, and from the Rapid River, located on the south slope. (R. at
3.) Capitol City has legally appropriated the waters of both the
Torpid River and the Rapid River, giving it the exclusive right to
use those waters. (R. at 4, 8.)
New Union has an elaborate statutory structure which gov-
erns all water allocation and acquisition within its jurisdiction.
(R. at 3-4.) New Union requires entities to obtain a permit from
the state's Water Engineer before diverting water from one river
basin into another. (R. at 4.) In 2002, New Union's Water Engi-
neer issued a diversion permit to Capitol City. (R. at 4.) The per-
mit authorized Capitol City to divert water from the Torpid River
into the Rapid River through the newly constructed Torpid
Aqueduct. (R. at 4.)
The Torpid River is a mountain stream which flows fast and
relatively clear for its first thirty miles. (R. at 4.) Thereafter, the
river becomes flat as it meanders slowly through farm and scrub-
20051 545
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land, where it accumulates silt from adjacent land and becomes
turbid. (R. at 4.) Capitol City's diversion of water from the Torpid
River into the Rapid River occurs at this part of the river. (R. at
4.) The Rapid River's waters flow fast and clear from its headwa-
ters until the point at which the Torpid Aqueduct adds water from
the Torpid River. (R. at 4.) The Rapid River has never been used
for navigation because of its numerous rapids and waterfalls. (R.
at 8.) Although the Rapid River was once a tributary to the navi-
gable Platte River, its waters have not flown into that river for 70
years. (R. at 8.) At present, the Rapid River flows into the Rapid
Reservoir, Capitol City's water supply dam built in 1937. (R. at 4,
8.) Moreover, Capitol City uses all of the water in the Rapid Res-
ervoir, ending the Rapid River's flow at the dam. (R. at 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
New Union May Intervene as a Matter of Right
The CWA assigns the ability to intervene in enforcement ac-
tions as a matter of right to the EPA Administrator. The CWA's
legislative history and broader context show that Congress in-
tended to treat the States as the equivalents of the EPA for en-
forcement purposes. Courts should construe statutory language
to effectuate congressional intent. Therefore, this court should
construe the CWA to permit New Union to intervene in this action
as a matter of right.
FSSC Provided Sufficient Notice
The CWA's citizen suit provision requires citizens to give no-
tice of their intent to sue 60-days before filing suit. Notice is ade-
quate if it provides sufficient information to advise the alleged
violator of its wrongful actions. FSSC satisfied the 60-day juris-
dictional requirement. FSSC's notice informed Capitol City of its
alleged section 1311(a) violation. FSSC properly identified itself
as the person giving notice because FSSC has organizational
standing. FSSC's notice correctly identified silt as the specific pol-
lutant, for silt forms the basis of the pollutant FSSC alleged in its
complaint. Finally, FSSC's notice accurately averred the dates of
violation alleged in its complaint because the CWA does not re-
quire notice to identify dates of violation of the same type occur-




The CWA Does Not Preempt State Water Allocation Authority
The CWA explicitly reserves States' authority over internal
water allocation because that authority is crucial to the economic
survival of arid states, including New Union. New Union exer-
cised that authority in granting a permit for Capitol City's diver-
sion. Accordingly, application of the CWA to the diversion would
contravene the express statutory language and legislative intent
behind the CWA.
Capitol City Did Not Violate the CWA
The CWA does not apply to the Rapid River because the stat-
ute applies only to water that is navigable or a tributary of naviga-
ble water. Rapids and waterfalls choke the Rapid River, making
it nonnavigable. Furthermore, the Rapid River is not a tributary
of navigable water. If this court holds that the Rapid River is nav-
igable, the CWA nonetheless does not apply. To fall under Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power the Rapid River part of interstate
commerce. Because it is not, the CWA does not apply.
Furthermore, the inquiry into Congress' Commerce Clause
powers poses a constitutional question. Courts have a duty to
avoid constitutional questions by reinterpreting statutes consis-
tent with congressional intent. The alternative interpretation of
"navigable waters" which treats all geographic bodies of water as
one unitary body of water is consistent with congressional intent.
Applying this interpretation, Capitol City did not add silt to the
waters of the United States because those pollutants were already
present in those waters.
ARGUMENT
I. NEW UNION IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (C) (2)
BECAUSE CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROVIDE STATES
WITH ENFORCEMENT POWERS EQUAL TO THOSE OF
THE EPA.
The CWA unambiguously assigns the ability to intervene by
right in any citizen suit to the EPA Administrator. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(c)(2). However, both the legislative history and the
broader context of the CWA indicate that Congress intended to
give the States enforcement rights and responsibilities on par
with those of the federal government. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 73-74
(1971); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1365(b)(1). Where Congress has
5472005]
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evinced a clear intention to achieve a particular result, courts
should not allow statutory language to the contrary to stand in the
way. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1920). Accord-
ingly, this Court should allow New Union to intervene in this ac-
tion as a matter of right.
A. The Legislative History of the CWA Demonstrates That
Congress Intended to Allow States to Intervene as a
Matter of Right.
Even when statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
courts should disregard that language if there is "a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary." Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
see also United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940). Courts may consult the statute's legislative history to de-
termine congressional intent. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at
543. The Senate or House committee reports are particularly per-
suasive evidence of congressional intent. Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 17 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The CWA's legislative, history shows that Congress intended
the States to take a leading role in enforcing the CWA. S. REP.
No. 92-414, at 73-74. For example, the Senate Committee Report
accompanying the CWA explained, "[tihe Committee intends the
great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the state." Id.
In fact, the EPA acknowledged in its testimony that the "primary
responsibility for enforcement remains with the States." EPA Tes-
timony at the Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation:
Hearing Before the Sen. Pub. Works Comm., 92d Cong. 1 (1971).
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended
to treat the States, at the very least, as the federal government's
equals for enforcement purposes.
B. The CWA's Broader Context Demonstrates That
Congress Intended to Allow States to Intervene as a
Matter of Right.
Courts should not attempt to construe statutory provisions in
isolation. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35
(1990). In Dole, the United States Supreme Court ("Court") ex-
plained, "[i]n expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy." Id. (internal citation omit-




ance with the policy of the legislation as a whole," courts should
look beyond that language and interpret the statute in a manner
consistent with congressional intent. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 194.
Thus, this court should examine the CWA's citizen suit interven-
tion provision in the statute's broader context to determine con-
gressional intent.
The CWA declares that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). In keeping with this intention, the CWA re-
quires citizens bringing enforcement actions to give notice of their
intent to sue not just to the EPA Administrator, but also to the
State in which the alleged violation occurred. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, the CWA prohibits citizens from in-
itiating enforcement actions in cases in which the EPA Adminis-
trator or the States have commenced actions of their own. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Thus, the statute's broader context dem-
onstrates that Congress intended to place the States on an equal
footing with the federal government in the enforcement of the
CWA. Because both the legislative history and the broader con-
text of the CWA show that Congress intended to allow states to
intervene in enforcement actions as a matter of right, this court
should allow New Union to intervene in this action as a matter of
right.
II. FSSC GAVE PROPER NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO SUE
CAPITOL CITY PURSUANT TO THE CWA'S CITIZEN
SUIT PROVISION BECAUSE IT SATISFIED THE
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS.
Congress authorized citizens to bring civil actions in federal
district court against any person alleged to be in violation of a
CWA effluent standard or limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
However, citizens may not bring suit unless and until they have
given 60 days' notice of their intent to sue to the alleged violator,
the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the EPA. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The purpose behind this 60-day notice re-
quirement is to give the alleged violator "an opportunity to bring
itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise
render unnecessary a citizen suit." Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
While the giving of notice is jurisdictional, the contents of no-
tice are not. Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules,
2005] 549
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Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1249 (3d Cir. 1995) ("PIRG"). Instead, notice is
adequate if it specifies sufficient information to advise the alleged
violator of its wrongful actions so that it can take corrective mea-
sures to avoid suit. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die
Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 1997). FSSC's notice in-
cluded all of the information required by regulation to inform Cap-
itol City that it allegedly violated section 1311(a) of the CWA by
discharging silt from the Torpid Aqueduct into the Rapid River
without a permit. Therefore, FSSC's notice was adequate. Ac-
cordingly, the district court erred in holding that the contents of
notice are jurisdictional and that FSSC's notice failed to identify
the specific information required by regulation.
A. FSSC Gave Adequate Notice Because It Satisfied the
CWA's Jurisdictional 60-Day Notice Provision and
Provided Sufficient Information to Inform Capitol
City of Its Alleged CWA Violation.
The CWA mandates that citizens provide notice of the alleged
statutory violation to the alleged violator, the State in which the
alleged violation occurs, and the EPA Administrator, but does not
specify the contents of notice. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1). Congress
delegated the task of defining the contents of notice to the EPA.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). EPA regulations provide that notice of an al-
leged CWA effluent standard or limitation violation
shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to
identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to
have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation,
the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the
location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such viola-
tion, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the
person giving notice.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, notice must be
sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator of its wrongful
actions so that the violator will know the corrective measures to
take in order to avoid suit. Stroh Die, 116 F.3d at 819.
The Court in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County held that the 60-
day wait period of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's
("RCRA") citizen suit notice provision is jurisdictional. 493 U.S.
20, 26 (1989). Thus, a district court has no discretion and must
dismiss a CWA citizen suit if no notice was given or if the action is




Found. v. ABC Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1096, 1097 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the CWA's 60-day notice provision is analogous to
the RCRA 60-day notice examined in Hallstrom). However, Hall-
strom's holding is limited to the statutory giving and timing of the
60-day notice requirement and did not address whether the regu-
latory substantive requirements of notice are jurisdictional.
PIRG, 50 F.3d at 1249.
Hallstrom applies only to statutory, not regulatory, citizen
suit requirements. Id. Admittedly, the CWA states that "[n]otice
... shall be given in such manner as the [EPA] shall prescribe by
regulation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (emphasis added). However,
EPA regulations require only that notice provide "sufficient infor-
mation" to allow the alleged violator to identify the contents re-
quired under the regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. Thus, the
regulation requires notice to "be adequate for the recipients ... to
identify the basis for the citizen's complaint" so that the alleged
violator can bring itself into compliance. PIRG, 50 F.3d at 1249.
This interpretation is in accordance with Congress' goal of requir-
ing sufficient notice without placing undue burdens on the person
giving notice. Congress urged the EPA to strike a balance, sug-
gesting that the "regulations should not require notice that places
impossible or unnecessary burdens on citizens but rather should
be confined to requiring information necessary to give clear indi-
cation of the citizens' intent." Id. at 1246 (quoting SEN. REP. No.
92-414, at 80).
FSSC satisfied the CWA's 60-day jurisdictional requirement,
for FSSC gave notice to Capitol City, New Union and the EPA on
June 1, 2004, and filed suit on August 1, 2004. (R. at 11, 3.)
FSSC's notice satisfied EPA regulations because it provided the
requisite "sufficient information." The notice identified FSSC as
the person giving notice and stated that Capitol City's diversion of
silt-laden water from the Torpid River through the Torpid
Aqueduct to the Rapid River constituted the alleged section
1311(a) violation of discharging silt, a pollutant, from a point
source into navigable waters without a permit. (R. at 11-12.)
Thus, FSSC's notice gave specific information from which Capitol
City could identify the basis for FSSC's prospective complaint. Ac-
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B. Even If the Content of Notice Is Jurisdictional, FSSC's
Notice Is Adequate Because It Included All of the
Specific Information Required by EPA Regulations.
EPA regulations require that notice include sufficient infor-
mation to (1) permit the recipient to identify the specific standard,
limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, (2) the activity
alleged to constitute the violation, (3) the person or persons re-
sponsible for the alleged violation, (4) the location of the alleged
violation, (5) the date or dates of such violation, and (6) the full
name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3. FSSC's notice unquestionably satisfied require-
ments (2), (3), and (4), for the notice explained that Capitol City's
diversion of silt-laden water from the Torpid River to the Rapid
River through the Torpid Aqueduct constituted the alleged viola-
tion. (R. at 11-12.) The district court found that FSSC's notice
failed to satisfy requirements (1), (5) and (6) because the notice did
not name the proper prospective plaintiffs, the pollutant alleged in
the complaint, and the dates of violations occurring after the date
of notice. However, the district court's conclusion is erroneous be-
cause FSSC's notice included all of the required information in
sufficient detail.
1. FSSC's notice properly identified FSSC as the person
giving notice.
Under EPA regulations, adequate notice must include the
"full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving
notice." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. FSSC's letter providing notice to Capi-
tol City and the EPA of its intent to sue included the full name of
FSSC, "Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc." (R. at 11.) The
letter also provided the address and telephone number at which
FSSC could be reached. (R. at 12.) Nonetheless, the district court
concluded that FSSC's notice was inadequate because it failed to
identify the real parties in interest, Spinner and Creel, as the par-
ties giving notice. (R. at 6.) The district court found that Spinner
and Creel were the real plaintiffs because FSSC, as an environ-
mental organization, had no standing to sue on its own but only on
behalf of its members who may have standing. (R. at 6.)
However, the district court misapplied the real party in inter-
est standard and erroneously concluded that FSSC does not have
standing. The real party in interest standard applies only to civil




tice provisions. Moreover, FSSC's notice satisfied the real party in
interest standard because FSSC has organizational standing. Ac-
cordingly, FSSC gave proper notice of its identity.
a. Rule 17's real party in interest standard does not
apply to notice.
Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). A real party in interest is one who
possesses the right to enforce and has a significant interest in the
claim upon which the plaintiff is suing. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973). The
substantive law upon which the claim is based determines
whether a plaintiff may enforce the asserted right and thus
whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest. Id. The purpose
behind Rule 17 is to allow persons having an equitable or benefi-
cial interest to bring suit to protect that interest without having to
rely on someone else to do so. Id.
The doctrine of standing derives from Article III, section 2, of
the Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). Article III provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
[and] the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Thus, Article III limits federal judicial power to the resolution of
"cases" and "controversies" authorized by the Constitution or fed-
eral statutes. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Sep-
aration of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). The
Court developed the doctrine of standing to determine whether a
plaintiff has presented a case or controversy justiciable in federal
court. Id. at 471-72. Standing requires a plaintiff to show that it
has suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant's
alleged actions and that the injury is redressable in court. Id. at
472.
Rule 17 and the doctrine of standing thus serve different in-
terests. Rule 17 ensures that only a plaintiff with a personal
stake in the outcome may sue in federal court and that res judi-
cata principles are served. Standing ensures that only bona fide
cases or controversies are brought before a federal court, thus pro-
tecting the Constitution's limit on the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, a person may be a real party in interest but fail one of
the standing requirements. However, once a party is found to
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have standing, Rule 17's real party in interest test is satisfied.
See Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1975).
Neither the CWA nor EPA regulations require that the person
giving notice be the real party in interest. In fact, the CWA man-
dates only that the would-be, not actual, plaintiff give notice.
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
174-75 (2000) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)). Moreover, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern only after an action is
brought in federal court. Prazak v. Local 1 Int'l Union of Bricklay-
ers & Allied Crafts, 233 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2000). In
Prazak, the court held that state procedural rules govern suits in
state court unless and until the civil action is removed and
brought in federal court. Id. at 1153-54 (citing Herb v. Pitcaim,
324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945)). Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not apply to procedural rules that govern activities
outside the realm of a civil action brought in federal court.
By its own terms, Rule 17 applies to the prosecution of civil
actions. FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a). Rule 17 thus does not govern proce-
dures that must take place before a civil action is brought in fed-
eral court. The CWA's notice provision is a statutory procedural
mandate that must occur before a civil action can be brought. Fur-
ther, the purpose of notice is to render civil action unnecessary.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. For example, notice may result in the
alleged violator coming into compliance before the 60-day wait pe-
riod expires or in the government commencing its own suit, either
of which would bar the citizen from filing suit. Id. at 60-61. Thus,
if a civil action is not brought Rule 17 may never be invoked.
Therefore, the district court's real party in interest analysis is
applicable only to FSSC as a plaintiff bringing suit in federal court
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not to FSSC as
the person giving notice pursuant to the CWA. Accordingly, the
district court misapplied its real party in interest concern. Be-
cause FSSC's letter identified FSSC as the person giving notice,
FSSC's notice was adequate.
b. FSSC is the real party in interest because FSSC has
organizational standing.
Should this Court hold that Rule 17 applies to notice, FSSC
must possess the right to enforce and have a significant interest in
its claim that Capitol City violated section 1311(a) of the CWA by
discharging pollutants into navigable waters without a permit.




at 1.) This provision applies only to a citizen "who can claim some
sort of injury." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 (1981). The CWA defines a citizen
who can claim some sort of injury as a "person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1365(g)). Through this definition, Congress intended "to
allow [citizen] suits by all persons possessing standing" under the
Court's holding in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Id.
(citing S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 146 (1972)). Accordingly,
FSSC's right to enforce section 1311(a) through the CWA's citizen
suit provision, and thus its satisfaction of Rule 17, depends upon
whether FSSC possesses standing.
The district court did not address whether FSSC or its mem-
bers, Spinner and Creel, had standing to sue because the court
dismissed the suit on other grounds. (R. at 4.) Nevertheless, fed-
eral appellate courts are obliged to determine standing even if the
issue is not raised on appeal. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331-32
(1977). Therefore, a standing analysis is warranted.
Standing requires three elements. First, a plaintiff must
show that "it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61). Second, the plaintiff must show that the "injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant." Laidlaw, 528
U.S. at 180. Finally, the plaintiff must show that "it is likely...
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at
181. Moreover, at the pleading stage, as here, "general factual al-
legations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suf-
fice, for on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to sup-
port the claim."' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).1 Standing, however, is
not limited to persons. An association, like FSSC, "has standing
to sue on behalf of its members when its members would other-
wise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake
are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim
1. Although the doctrine of standing also embraces prudential considerations,
such as whether the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff is within the zone
of interests protected by the statute, those prudential considerations do not apply to
citizen suit provisions, including the CWA's, that expressly negate such considera-
tions by permitting "any person" with a defined interest to bring suit. Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1997).
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asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of indi-
vidual members in the lawsuit." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181 (citing
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977)). Accordingly, for FSSC has "organizational standing,"
Spinner and Creel must have standing to sue in their own right.
Spinner and Creel alleged injury in fact in their affidavits.
"[Pilaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that
they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic
and recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the chal-
lenged activity." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Morton, 405
U.S. at 735). Spinner and Creel aver that they are avid fly fisher-
men who fish on Rapid River because it is close to home and con-
tains the South Slope Cutthroat Trout ("Cutthroat"), a fish native
to the waters of New Union. (R. at 13-14.) The men claim that
since August 2003 they have been unable to fish in Rapid River
downstream from the Torpid Aqueduct because the Cutthroat
have disappeared. (R. at 13-14.) Although Spinner and Creel can
and do fish for Cutthroat upstream and in other river basins, the
Court in Laidlaw held that sworn statements averring that recre-
ational activities are no longer engaged in near a river where pol-
lutants are discharged or in a particular downstream area
because of the discharge are sufficient facts to support injury in
fact. 528 U.S. at 183-85. Accordingly, Spinner and Creel satisfy
the injury in fact requirement because their averred inability to
fish below the Torpid Aqueduct is a concrete, particularized and
actual injury.
Spinner and Creel's injury is fairly traceable to Capitol City's
alleged violation of section 1311(a) by discharging silt into Rapid
River without a permit. Spinner and Creel stated that their in-
ability to see or catch Cutthroat occurred when Capitol City began
diverting water from the Torpid River into the Rapid River in mid-
August. (R. at 13, 14.) Spinner claimed that he had "never seen
the trout thrive in waters that were not clear and was not sur-
prised when they stopped living below the Aqueduct discharge."
(R. at 13.) Creel's affidavit pointed to a letter from the New Union
Fish and Game Department's Director ("Director") which admit-
ted that the Cutthroat likely will not survive below the Torpid
Aqueduct in the silt-laden water. (R. at 15.) In fact, suspended
and settleable solids such as silt can decrease the passage of light
through water and result in water heating more rapidly, which
can adversely affect aquatic life adapted to lower temperatures.




www.epa.gov/ volunteer/streanvms58.html (Sept. 9, 2003) (AP-
PENDIX D). On a motion to dismiss, we must presume that Spin-
ner and Creel's allegations support the inference that their
inability to fish is fairly traceable to Capitol City's discharge of silt
into Rapid River. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Finally, a favorable decision will redress Spinner and Creel's
injury. FSSC seeks an injunction against further discharges of
silt into Rapid River except in accordance with a duly issued per-
mit. (R. at 11.) If granted, an injunction likely will allow the wa-
ters below Rapid River to regain clarity and become habitable for
the Cutthroat to survive. (R. at 11.) Moreover, even if the dis-
charge continues but is subject to permit requirements, those limi-
tations may be strict enough to allow for habitable water.
Therefore, an injunction against Capitol City's discharge of silt
into the Rapid River will redress Spinner and Creel's injury.
Accordingly, Spinner and Creel have standing to sue in their
own right. Further, the interests at stake here are germane to
FSSC's purpose, for FSSC is a non-profit organization committed
to the Cutthroat in New Union. (R. at 11.) Hence, the Cutthroat's
survival is the centerpiece of FSSC's existence. Additionally,
nothing in the record indicates that FSSC's claim or their re-
quested injunction relief requires the participation of individual
members such as Spinner and Creel in the actual lawsuit. Thus,
FSSC has organizational standing to sue on behalf of its members
under the CWA's citizen suit provision.
Once a party is found to have standing, Rule 17's real party in
interest test is satisfied. See Apter, 510 F.2d at 353. Here, FSSC
possesses the right to enforce effluent standards or limitations of
section 1311(a) through the CWA's citizen suit provision because it
has organizational standing. Hence, FSSC has the right to en-
force and a significant interest in the claim upon which it is suing,
satisfying the real party in interest standard. Accordingly, FSSC
properly identified itself as the would-be plaintiff giving notice of
its intent to sue.
2. FSSC's notice identified the specific pollutant which
forms the basis of its complaint.
Adequate notice must provide sufficient information to iden-
tify the "specific standard, [or] limitation.., alleged to have been
violated." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. The standards and limitations upon
which citizens can bring suit include "an unlawful act under sub-
section (a) of section 1311." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). An unlawful act
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under section 1311(a) includes the discharge of a pollutant from a
point source into navigable waters without a permit or applicable
exception. Stroh Die, 116 F.3d at 818. Additionally, adequate no-
tice must include the "activity alleged to constitute" the violation
by identifying with reasonable specificity the pollutant alleged to
have been unlawfully discharged. Catskill Mountains Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir.
2001).
FSSC's notice alleged that Capitol City violated section
13 1 (a) by discharging silt, a pollutant, from the Torpid Aqueduct,
a point source, into the Rapid River, navigable water, without a
permit. (R. at 11.) Silt is a pollutant. Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d
1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2). Hence,
FSSC properly identified with sufficient specificity the standard
or limitation Capitol City allegedly violated, as well as the activity
and pollutant alleged to constitute the violation. However,
FSSC's actual complaint alleged additions of suspended and set-
tleable solids, not silt. (R. at 6.) The district court thus concluded
that FSSC's notice was inadequate because it did not specify the
actual pollutant-suspended and settleable solids-upon which it
would sue. (R. at 6.) However, FSSC's notice properly identified
the specific pollutant that it would sue upon because silt is a com-
ponent of suspended and settleable solids. Moreover, FSSC's suit
can be limited to the specific pollutant alleged in its notice instead
of the more general category of pollutants alleged in its complaint.
The Second Circuit in Catskill held that notice "must include
the pollutant alleged to be the basis of a violation subsequently
alleged in the complaint" because such specificity better allows
both enforcement agencies and violators to take prompt corrective
measures. 273 F.3d at 487-88. However, the court also held that
notice is adequate if the pollutant alleged in the complaint by defi-
nition depends upon the pollutant alleged in the notice. Id. at 489.
Thus, the court held that notice of a CWA violation based on dis-
charges of suspended solids was sufficient to provide notice of an
eventual claim based on discharges of turbidity because water
cannot be turbid without suspended solids. Id. at 488-89. Accord-
ingly, the exact name of the pollutant alleged in the complaint
need not mirror that of the pollutant alleged in the notice if a suf-
ficient relationship exists between the two pollutants. Id.
By definition, "suspended solids" includes silt. Monitoring
and Assessing Water Quality, EPA, at http://www.epa.gov/volun-




pended and settleable solids are subsets of "total solids," a general
name used to refer to solids measured in water quality manage-
ment. Id. Therefore, suspended solids, settleable solids and silt
are pollutants with a definitional relationship. Moreover, FSSC's
complaint alleged the more general pollutant, suspended solids,
whereas its notice alleged the specific pollutant, silt. (R. at 6, 11.)
Hence, this is not a case in which FSSC gave notice of a general
pollutant and then filed suit based upon a specific pollutant. The
notice's specific identification of silt-laden water discharged from
the Torpid Aqueduct surpassed the "reasonable specificity" stan-
dard and allowed Capitol City to understand the alleged violation
and to rectify the problem. Further, although suspended solids by
definition can include other particulate matter, FSSC likely will
be limited in its suit to the specific pollutant, silt, which it prop-
erly alleged in the notice. Catksill, 273 F.3d at 488-89. Therefore,
FSSC adequately provided notice of the specific pollutant alleged
to constitute Capitol City's section 1311(a) violation.
3. The CWA does not require FSSC to allege each day of
violation in its notice.
Adequate notice also must provide "the date or dates" of the
alleged effluent standard or limitation violation. 40 C.F.R.
§ 135.3. FSSC's notice alleged section 1311(a) violations each and
every day from August 15, 2003, until June 1, 2004, the date of the
notice. (R. at 11.) FSSC's complaint alleged violations up to and
after August 15, 2004, the date the complaint was filed. (R. at 6.)
The district court dismissed the complaint for all violations al-
leged to have occurred after June 1, 2004, because the notice al-
leged no violations after this date. (R. at 6-7.)
However, the CWA does not require a citizen to give notice of
each violation of a specific discharge limitation. PIRG, 50 F.3d at
1247-48. Although a "literal reading" of the 60-day notice provi-
sion requires a citizen to identify the alleged effluent standard or
limitation violation, the statute is silent as to whether a citizen
must allege each day of such violation. Id. 2 Thus, notice which
identifies the specific violation is sufficient to "identify violations
of the same type . . . occurring both during and after the period
covered by the notice letter." Id. at 1250. Accordingly, the Third
Circuit in PIRG reinstated post-notice, pre-complaint violations of
2. This is in contrast to the CWA's civil and criminal penalty provisions, which
provide that civil penalties and criminal fines should be assessed on a per day of viola-
tion standard. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1319(d).
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the same type alleged in the notice that the district court had dis-
missed. Id.
The Court's decision in Gwaltney supports this conclusion. 3
There, the Court held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
over CWA citizen suits for wholly past violations. Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 64. The Court explained that Congress' use of the phrase
"to be in violation" in section 1365(a) of the CWA requires a plain-
tiff bringing a citizen suit to "make a good-faith allegation [in the
complaint] of continuous or intermittent violation" in order to in-
voke the federal court's jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the CWA "make[s]
plain that the interest of the citizen-plaintiff is primarily forward-
looking." Id. at 59.
The Third Circuit held that "[blecause a citizen must delay
filing suit for at least 60 days after notice has been sent, it is fore-
seeable that a complaint will include allegations of more recent
violations in an effort to establish [the] 'continuous or intermittent
violations"' required by Gwaltney. PIRG, 50 F.3d at 1251. A rule
that dismisses violations of the same type occurring after the al-
leged dates of violation in the notice is incompatible with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Gwaltney for two reasons. First, forcing
citizens to allege violations which may take place in the future in
their notice arguably violates Gwaltney's standard that citizens
make "good faith" allegations as to the present nature of the viola-
tion, for citizens cannot allege violations which have not yet oc-
curred. Stroh Die, 116 F.3d at 820-21. Second, if the district court
dismisses the current violations alleged in the complaint because
they were not alleged in the notice, the district court must dismiss
the entire complaint because it does not contain allegations of
"continuous or intermittent violations" as required under
Gwaltney. This conclusion thus leads to a harsh and untenable
result, for it forces citizens to either guess at prospective violation
dates or risk having valid claims dismissed because of technical
pre-complaint procedural errors. Moreover, this result contra-
venes Congress' intent that notice provide sufficient information
to the alleged violator without overburdening prospective citizen-
plaintiffs. SEN. REP. No. 92-414, at 80.
3. The 60-day notice at issue here and the complaint at issue in Gwaltney in-
volve two separate jurisdictional requirements for bringing a citizen suit. See PIRG,
50 F.3d at 1251. However, the decision in Gwaltney that "[c]ontinuing or intermittent
violations of the same type are necessary to create jurisdiction of the citizen ... are





Thus, the CWA's notice provision requires citizens to allege
only the dates of violation of which citizens are aware. As long as
the post-notice, pre-complaint violations alleged in the complaint
are of the same type and nature as those alleged in the notice let-
ter, notice is sufficient. PIRG, 50 F.3d at 1250-51. Here, FSSC's
complaint alleged section 1311(a) violations of the same type and
nature as those alleged in FSSC's notice. Hence, the fact that
FSSC's complaint alleged violations occurring after the dates of
violations alleged in FSSC's notice is negligible. Accordingly,
FSSC's notice identified the person giving notice, the specific pol-
lutant which constitutes the alleged violation, and the dates of
that violation. Therefore, FSSC's notice was adequate.
III. THE CWA DOES NOT APPLY TO NEW UNION'S
WATER ALLOCATION PROGRAM BECAUSE
CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO PREEMPT STATE
AUTHORITY OVER INTERNAL WATER ALLOCATION.
New Union intervened in this action to preserve its authority
over water allocation. New Union's issuance of a permit for Capi-
tol City's diversion obviated application of the CWA to the diver-
sion. The CWA states unequivocally that "the authority of each
State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall
not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this chap-
ter." 33 U.S.C. §1251(g). Congress added this provision in order
to prevent courts from construing the CWA as a federal preemp-
tion of state authority to allocate quantities of water within their
jurisdictions. 123 Cong. Rec. S39211 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)
(statement of Sen. Wallop), LEXIS 95 Cong. Senate Debates 1977,
at *39211 (APPENDIX C). Because the CWA's statutory language
and legislative history indicate that Congress did not intend to
preempt these decisions, and because States should retain author-
ity over water allocation, the district court properly granted sum-
mary judgment.
A. The CWA's Legislative History Demonstrates That
Congress Did Not Intend to Preempt State Authority
Over Water Allocation.
The CWA does not preempt New Union's regulatory authority
to allocate its water quantities because Congress did not intend
for the CWA to preempt state water allocation authority. Gade v.
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
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208 (1985)). Federal preemption of state law may occur when
Congress crafts statutory language which expressly preempts
state law or when congressional intent to preempt can be inferred
from statutory language. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). In either case, congressional
intent to preempt is an essential ingredient in any judicial finding
of preemption. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541
(2001).
The Court has applied these principles of preemption to the
CWA. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) ("SWANCC").
In SWANCC, the Court held that States have "traditional and pri-
mary power" over water use within their borders. Id. at 174. Ac-
cordingly, the Court refused to extend the CWA to interfere with a
state decision regarding water use absent "a clear indication that
Congress intended that result." Id. at 172. The Court then held
the statutory recognition of "the primary responsibilities and
rights of States . . . to plan the development and use ... of land
and water resources" contained in section 1251(b) sufficient to
prohibit federal interference with the state regulatory process. Id.
at 174. 4
The CWA's language and legislative history show that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt New Union's authority to allocate
water. First, Congress explicitly reserved States' power over in-
ternal water allocation declaring "that the authority of each State
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(g). Thus, Congress unambiguously stated its intent
4. Although the Court addressed an issue similar to the one under consideration
here in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994),
that case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, Jefferson County involved navi-
gable interstate waters while this case involves nonnavigable intrastate waters.
Thus, the federal interest involved in Jefferson County was substantially greater than
the federal interest involved here. Second, the Court in Jefferson County stated in
dicta that "the authority of each state to allocate water quantity" does not "limit the
scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users who have obtained...
a water allocation." However, because Jefferson County involved state-imposed condi-
tions upon navigable interstate waters, this dictum should not be construed to allow
the imposition of federal conditions upon isolated nonnavigable intrastate waters
when the State opposes such conditions. As explained below, such a construction is
contrary to the legislative intent behind the CWA as well as sound public policy. Fi-
nally, the holding in Jefferson County is limited to the proposition that the CWA "al-
lows States to impose conditions based upon several enumerated sections of the Clean
Water Act and 'any other appropriate requirement of State law.'" This holding is not




to leave state authority to regulate internal water allocations un-
touched by the CWA. Id. Moreover, Congress directed federal
agencies to cooperate with the States outside of the CWA frame-
work to find solutions to pollution problems caused by state water
management. Id.
Second, the legislative history supports the conclusion that
Congress designed this provision to prevent federal interference
with state water diversion projects. The original CWA of 1972
contained several provisions designed to preserve states' rights.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1370. Congress added the provision quoted
above during the 1977 amendment process in response to a policy
paper by the Water Resource Council which concluded that reduc-
ing water diversions resulting from state management policies
might be necessary to solve water quality problems. 42 Fed. Reg.
36,788, 36,793 (July 15, 1977). The author of the amendment,
Senator Malcolm Wallop, explained that it was necessary to "reas-
sure the State [sic] that it is the policy of Congress that the Clean
Water Act will not be used for the purpose of interfering with
State water rights systems." 123 Cong. Rec. S39211 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1977) (statement of Sen. Wallop), LEXIS 95 Cong. Senate
Debates 1977, at *39211 (APPENDIX C). This legislative history
demonstrates that Congress did not intend courts to construe the
CWA as a preemption of state authority over water allocation.
B. The CWA Does Not Apply to State Water Diversion
Projects Because Application Would Threaten the
Economic Vitality of Arid States.
CWA application to state water allocation projects would stifle
diversion projects which are essential to the economic survival of
arid states, such as New Union. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1981). Due to prevailing
conditions of systemic scarcity, many arid states have adopted
"maximum utilization" strategies which allow the timely diversion
of water resources to the areas of greatest need. Fellhauer v. Peo-
ple, 167 Colo. 320, 336 (1968). In many cases, these diversions
must utilize natural watercourses to transfer water in an econom-
ically viable manner. See e.g. Jacarilla Apache Tribe, 657 F.2d at
1132; City of L.A. v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 76-77 (1943).
Furthermore, arid states authorize immediate diversions during
water shortages because time is crucial during these emergencies.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(7) (2002) (Colorado); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 416.030 (2004) (Nevada); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-24.1
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(2004) (New Mexico). Unfortunately, the minimum time between
submission of an application and issuance of a permit under the
CWA is 180 days. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(c). As a result, CWA applica-
tion to state water diversion projects threatens the economic vital-
ity of arid states, such as New Union.5 (R. at 15-16.) As the
Director of New Union's Fish and Game Department explained
without the diversion would "remove such a great percent [sic] of
[Capitol City's] water supply [that it] would be an intolerable eco-
nomic burden and a danger to its public health." (R. at 15.)
Therefore, this Court should hold that New Union's granting of a
permit for Capitol City's diversion obviates application of the CWA
to the diversion.
IV. CAPITOL CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE CWA
BECAUSE THE RAPID RIVER IS NOT NAVIGABLE
WATER AND CAPITOL CITY DID NOT ADD A
POLLUTANT.
The CWA prohibits the addition of pollutants into navigable
water without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342. Without nav-
igable water or without the addition of a pollutant, the CWA does
not apply. The district court correctly held that the Rapid River is
not navigable water. (R. at 9.) Regardless, Capitol City did not
add a pollutant into navigable water because the pollutant silt
was already present in the waters of the United States. (R. at 9.)
Therefore, this court should affirm the district court and hold that
Capitol City did not violate section 1311(a).
A. The CWA Does Not Apply to Rapid River Because It Is
Not Navigable Water and It Is Outside of Congress'
Commerce Clause Powers.
Congress' authority to regulate navigable waters derives from
its Commerce Clause powers. United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). Therefore, any understand-
ing of the navigable waters governed by the CWA exists within the
limits of the Commerce Clause. The CWA defines navigable water
as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). EPA regulations further define waters of the
5. However, the unitary theory of water, introduced in Argument Section IV.B
would provide an interpretation of the CWA that would allow states to divert water
for re-allocation without a federal permit. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Mic-




United States as those waters which may be used in interstate
commerce or are tributaries of waters which may be used in inter-
state commerce. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Because the Commerce
Clause limits Congress' power to regulate navigable waters, the
scope of the CWA may not be greater than Congress' traditional
powers to regulate navigable waters.
Congress' traditional powers to regulate navigable waters are
limited to waters "which are accessible from a State other than
those in which they lie." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 173 (1979); H. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, at 97 (1977). In Kai-
ser, the Court explained that the limits of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers over navigable waters are those waters which may
be used in their present condition to transport interstate or for-
eign commerce. 444 U.S. at 173. Congress' power to regulate nav-
igable waters is limited to waters which are navigable in fact
when "used or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi-
tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870). Therefore, the
CWA may only regulate waters which are or are related to waters
which may be used in interstate or foreign commerce.
1. EPA's definition of navigable waters encompassing
solely intrastate waters is invalid because Congress
did not grant the EPA authority to regulate those
waters.
EPA regulations that purport to include the Rapid River
within the jurisdiction of the CWA without requiring a surface
connection to navigable waters are outside the scope of powers
Congress granted to the EPA. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171. In
SWANCC, the Court held that Congress did not grant agencies
jurisdiction to regulate "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate wa-
ters." Id. The Court invalidated a United States Army Corps reg-
ulation that defined waters of the United States to include
intrastate waters which may have been used as a habitat for mi-
gratory birds. Id. at 164, 171. EPA regulations define the waters
of the United States to include solely intrastate waters that may
be used in interstate commerce either for fishing or recreational
purposes. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Though the Court in SWANCC only
invalidated the one regulation, the logical extension of the holding
is that similar regulations, such as the one here that purports to
cover solely intrastate waters, are invalid. See United States v.
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Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
the logical extension of SWANCC is that portions of 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 defining waters of the United States to include intrastate
waters are invalid); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), containing the
same relevant text as 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, invalid because it ex-
ceeded the regulatory jurisdiction of the United States Army
Corps). Therefore, the portions of EPA regulations that attempt
to include nonnavigable intrastate waters are invalid because the
Court held in SWANCC that the term navigable water is not with-
out meaning in the CWA. 531 U.S. at 172. Waters must bear
some connection with navigable water, which the Rapid River
does not.
2. The Rapid River does not fall within the CWA's
jurisdiction of navigable waters because it is neither
navigable in fact nor a tributary of navigable
waters.
While the portions of EPA regulations that regulate intra-
state waters are invalid, the EPA still properly regulates inter-
state waters and waters that are tributaries of interstate waters.
A tributary of navigable water is one which bears a surface con-
nection to navigable water. Quivira Mining Co. v. United States
EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985). Therefore, to fall within
the CWA, the water must either be navigable in its own right or at
least bear a surface connection to navigable water. SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 172; Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257; Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917 (E.D. Mich. 2003); 40
C.F.R. § 122.2. The Rapid River does not fall within these defini-
tions because the Rapid River is neither navigable nor a tributary.
The Rapid River is not navigable water because waterfalls
and rapids along the river prevent navigation. (R. at 8.) Addition-
ally, the Rapid River is not navigable in fact because it is located
wholly within New Union and may not be used as a highway of
interstate commerce. (R. at 3-4.)
The Rapid River is not a tributary of navigable water. Al-
though the Platte River is navigable water, the Rapid River is not
a tributary of it. (R. at 8.) Furthermore, the Rapid River has not
been a tributary of the Platte River for seventy years, nor will it be
in the future. (R. at 8.) Because the Rapid River no longer flows
to the Platte River, even intermittently, the Rapid River is not its




navigability of a body of water may change and thus the CWA's
jurisdiction also may change). Furthermore, although the Rapid
River is a tributary of Rapid Reservoir, the reservoir is not naviga-
ble. (R. at 4.). It is not navigable because it is enclosed by a dam
on one side and a nonnavigable river on the other. (R. at 4.);
Weaver v. Hollywood, 255 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating
that "a dam and a bridge which prevent a riverboat casino from
traveling over 300 yards are presumably not susceptible to com-
mercial shipping" and thus the water was not navigable in fact).
All water in Rapid Reservoir is used as drinking water for Capital
City and thus Rapid Reservoir itself is not a tributary of navigable
water. (R. at 4.); Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
526, 534 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that the CWA regulates
tributaries only when they eventually flow into a navigable
water). Also, the Rapid Reservoir is located wholly within New
Union and so may not be used as a highway for commerce. (R. at
3-4.) Therefore, the Rapid Reservoir is not navigable water. Be-
cause the Rapid River is not a tributary of navigable water, the
Rapid River is not subject to CWA regulation.
3. Even if the Rapid River is navigable water, it is outside
the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Congress enacted the CWA pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133. The Commerce Clause per-
mits Congress to regulate "[c]ommerce . . . among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress may regulate an
activity only if it falls into one of three distinct categories. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000). First, Congress may
regulate the "use of the channels of interstate commerce." Id. at
609. Second, Congress may regulate the instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce or the persons or things in interstate com-
merce. Id. Lastly, Congress may regulate activities substantially
related to interstate commerce. Id.
Here, the Rapid River is not a channel of interstate com-
merce, for it is located solely within New Union. (R. at 4.) Nor is
the Rapid River an instrumentality or thing involved in interstate
commerce for it is used solely by the citizens of Capitol City. (R. at
4.) Therefore, Congress may regulate Capitol City's activities only
if those activities are substantially related to interstate commerce.
The Rapid River is outside the scope of Congress' powers because
the Rapid River bears no substantial relationship to interstate
commerce. To determine whether a substantial relationship ex-
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ists, this court must balance four factors: (1) whether the statute
regulates "economic activity"; (2) whether the statute contains an
"express jurisdictional element" that limits the application of the
statute to interstate commerce; (3) whether Congress made ex-
press legislative findings that the activity bears a substantial re-
lation to interstate commerce; (4) whether the activity's
relationship to interstate commerce is too attenuated. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 610 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1995)).
First, whether the regulated activity is economic is the cen-
tral element to determining the extent of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. The Court noted that
"'any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate
commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said that
the commerce power may reach so far."' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60). Therefore, regulation of a
non-economic activity must have an "evident commercial nexus."
Id. Capitol City's diversion of water is not an economic activity
and does it have an evident commercial nexus because the diver-
sion is not diverting water for profit but rather to assist in the
general welfare of its citizens. The fact that activity is
noneconomic, tips the balance in favor of determining that Con-
gress does not have authority to regulate the diversion.
Second, whether the regulation contains an express jurisdic-
tional element that limits the statute's application to interstate
commerce also is relevant. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (citing Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 562). Here, the CWA contains an express jurisdic-
tional element. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The phrase "navigable
water" in section 1362 limits the CWA's scope to those waters that
are or have a relationship to traditional navigable waters.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. As established, the Rapid River is not
navigable water and does not possess a relationship with naviga-
ble water. (R. at 8.) Therefore, the CWA's jurisdictional limitation
prohibits its application to waters such as the Rapid River.
Third, courts should consider express congressional findings
concerning the regulated activity's relationship to interstate com-
merce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. Here, Congress did not make
findings that state water diversion programs bear a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. Nonetheless, had Congress
made findings with respect to state water diversion programs, the




sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
Lastly, even if a relationship exists with interstate commerce,
the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to regulate that
activity if the relationship is too attenuated. Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 612. In Morrison, the Court rejected noneconomic activities
that indirectly affected interstate commerce as too attenuated.
529 U.S. at 615. For example, violent crime may have an effect on
the national economy but that relationship is too attenuated. Id.
Capitol City's water diversion program is not an economic activity
and has, at best, an indirect effect on interstate commerce. This
court may not rely on an indirect causal chain to determine that
the CWA applies to the Rapid River. Subsequent to the Court's
holdings in Morrison and Lopez and using the interpretations of
navigable waters urged on us by other courts, Congress does not
possess Commerce Clause authority to regulate the Rapid River.
As this discussion reflects, this case presents a constitutional
question as to whether Congress may regulate nonnavigable in-
trastate waters. To find navigability on these facts, this court
must consider the constitutional question posed here. However, if
possible, courts must construe statutes in order to avoid any con-
stitutional question. Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding
"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress"). The argument that follows is
an interpretation consistent with congressional intent which
avoids this constitutional question. However, if this court rejects
the following argument and considers the constitutional question,
then, pursuant to Morrison, Congress may not regulate the Rapid
River.
B. If This Court Determines That Rapid River Is
Navigable Water, Then Capitol City Did Not Add a
Pollutant to the Rapid River Because the Silt
Already Was Part of the Waters of the United
States.
Traditionally, courts have understood the CWA to treat each
body of navigable water as a separate and distinct source requir-
ing regulation. See S. Fla., 124 S.Ct. at 1544-45. Thus, the CWA
does not apply to wholly intrastate bodies of water. SWANCC,
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531 U.S. at 171. This arguably contravenes Congress' intent that
"the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible consti-
tutional interpretation." S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144. The
interpretation that gives the broadest possible constitutional in-
terpretation to the term navigable waters would recognize no legal
distinction between separate bodies of water. This interpretation
acknowledges that all waters are part of the same hydrological
system. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77. This "unitary theory of water"
solves the constitutional problem presented above. If all waters
are the same, then the Commerce Clause permits Congress to reg-
ulate isolated intrastate waters because those waters are part of
the larger hydrological system that includes navigable bodies of
water.
The unitary theory of water derives from a basic standard of
statutory construction: courts are to interpret statutes based on
their plain meaning. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11
(1962). Section 1311(a) defines the discharge of a pollutant as
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Conspicuously missing from this
phrase is the word "any" before "navigable waters." This phrase
plainly means that there are many kinds of pollutants, many
kinds of additions, and many point sources, but only one navigable
water-the waters of the United States. Section 1312(a)'s refer-
ence to "water quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters"
supports this construction. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (emphasis added).
The reference not only to a "specific portion" but also to navigable
waters as "the" navigable waters demonstrates Congress' under-
standing that the waters of the United States are one body of
water. Furthermore, this definition is consistent with Congress'
use of the phrase waters of the United States to define navigable
waters.
Because water moves in hydrological cycles, waters located in
one location may travel, through evaporation, surface movement,
or ground water, to an entirely separate place. See S. REP. No. 92-
414, at 77 (noting that "water moves in hydrologic cycles"). Con-
gress, recognizing and understanding this hydrological cycle, in-
tended to regulate all waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7); S. REP. No. 95-370, at 75 (1977). The legislative history
discussing the phrase navigable waters reflects Congress' under-
standing that the waters of the United States are so interrelated
that regulation of the waters at one location protects the water




(explaining that the adverse effects of pollution must be addressed
where the pollutants were first discharged). Congress intended to
regulate the introduction of pollutants into the waters of the
United States and to regulate all waters of the United States.
However, Congress cannot regulate all waters under the Com-
merce Clause so long as this court interprets navigable waters as
referring to separate bodies of water. Therefore, to effectuate con-
gressional intent to regulate all waters, this court should hold that
the CWA regulates navigable waters as a unitary body of national
waters.
Congress understood that it was regulating the addition of
pollutants into the waters, as opposed to the re-distribution of the
nation's waters, as here. The main culprit with respect to water
pollution is not the diversion of waters from one water basin to the
other, but rather persons dumping pollutants into the navigable
waters. S. REP. No. 95-370 (explaining throughout the legislative
history that the purpose of the CWA is to regulate dumping of pol-
lutants, such as municipal and industrial waste, into the nation's
waters). Congress' express concern was the disposal and dumping
of sludge and toxic materials by industrial dischargers into the
navigable waters. Id. The legislative history does not mention
state water diversion programs and their possible effects on water
quality.
Dumping and diversion are two activities that the CWA can-
not consistently regulate. Courts can continue to construe the
navigable waters as referring to separate and distinct bodies of
water, at which point water diversion may be properly regulated
in almost all instances, except, of course, when the reach of the
Commerce Clause does not permit such regulation. Alternatively,
courts could construe the CWA to mean that all waters are the
same water, and thus permit the CWA's regulation of each and
every single act of dumping into any body of water, no matter its
location, size or use. If all waters are the same, then regulation of
any body of water necessarily affects interstate commerce. Thus,
the Commerce Clause would not limit Congress' ability to regulate
the introduction of pollutants into solely intrastate puddles that
bear no relation to interstate commerce, which is not presently the
case. See SWANCC, 539 U.S. at 172.
The Torpid River naturally accumulates silt from adjacent
land as it meanders toward the Torpid Aqueduct. (R. at 4.) The
pollutant in this case, silt, already was in the nation's waters
whether or not the water traveled through the Torpid Aqueduct.
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Applying the unitary theory of water, the water diversion at issue
here is not an addition of pollutants into the waters of the United
States.
Adoption of the unitary theory of water would require a rein-
terpretation of other aspects of the CWA and accompanying regu-
lations. This court can avoid that result by holding that the Rapid
River is not navigable water within the traditional definition of
navigable waters. That approach also would allow this court to
bypass the constitutional question posed by the facts of this case
and this court's obligation to interpret the CWA to avoid that ques-
tion. Nonetheless, if this court holds that the Rapid River is navi-
gable water, the unitary theory of water interprets the CWA
consistent with congressional intent and obviates the constitu-
tional question.
CONCLUSION
The Commerce Clause constitutes an essential bulwark
against congressional encroachments on state authority. Federal
regulation of state diversions of nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters would exceed the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and imperil the economic wellbeing of arid
states like New Union. Because FSSC gave sufficient notice and
New Union may intervene in this action as a matter of right, this
court should evaluate this action on the merits and hold that the
CWA does not reach isolated intrastate waters and does not pre-
empt state authority over internal water allocation. Therefore,
this court should AFFIRM the district court's holding that New
Union may intervene as a matter of right, REVERSE and hold
that FSSC's notice was proper, AFFIRM that the CWA does not
preempt state water allocation authority, and AFFIRM that the
Rapid River is not navigable water and that Capitol City did not
add pollutants to the Rapid River.
Respectfully Submitted
UC Hastings College of the Law
Counsel for New Union
APPENDIX A- Statutory Provisions
28 USCS § 1291: The courts of appeals (other than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have juris-
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States, the United States District Court for the Dis-




trict Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to
the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of
this title.
28 USCS § 1331: The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.
33 USCS § 1251: (b) Congressional recognition, preservation, and
protection of primary responsibilities and rights of States. It is the
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water re-
sources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of
his authority under this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]. It is the
policy of Congress that the States manage the construction grant
program under this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] and implement
the permit programs under sections 402 and 404 of this Act [33
USCS §§ 1342, 1344]. It is further the policy of the Congress to
support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction,
and elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal technical ser-
vices and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and munic-
ipalities in connection with the prevention, reduction, and
elimination of pollution.
(g) Authority of States over water. It is the policy of Congress that
the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within
its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise
impaired by this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]. It is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et
seq.] shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quanti-
ties of water which have been established by any State. Federal
agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollu-
tion in concert with programs for managing water resources.
33 USCS § 1311: (a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in
compliance with law. Except as in compliance with this section
and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act [33 USCS
§§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 13441, the discharge of any pollu-
tant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 USCS § 1312: (a) Establishment. Whenever, in the judgment
of the Administrator or as identified under section 304 (1) [33
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USCS § 1314 (1)], discharges of pollutants from a point source or
group of point sources, with the application of effluent limitations
required under section 301(b)(2) of this Act [33 USCS
§ 1311(b)(2)], would interfere with the attainment or maintenance
of that water quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters
which shall assure protection of public health, public water sup-
plies, agricultural and industrial uses, and the protection and
propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife,
and allow recreational activities in and on the water, effluent limi-
tations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such
point source or sources shall be established which can reasonably
be expected to contribute to the attainment or maintenance of
such water quality.
33 USCS § 1362: (7) The term "navigable waters" means the wa-
ters of the United States, including the territorial seas.
33 USCS § 1365: (a) Authorization; jurisdiction. Except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section and section 309(g)(6) [33
USCS § 1319(g)(6)), any citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and
(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this Act [33 USCS
§§ 1251 et seq.] or (B) an order issued by the Administra-
tor or a State with respect to such a standard or limita-
tion, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] which is not discretionary
with the Administrator. The district courts shall have ju-
risdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the
Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section 309(d) of this Act [33 USCS § 1319(d)].
(b) Notice. No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to




(iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation,
or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States, or a State to require com-
pliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in
any such action in a court of the United States any cit-
izen may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days
after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Ad-
ministrator, except that such action may be brought imme-
diately after such notification in the case of an action
under this section respecting a violation of sections 306
and 307(a) of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1316, 1317(a)]. Notice
under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the
Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator; United States interests
protected.
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source of
an effluent standard or limitation or an order respecting
such standard or limitation may be brought under this sec-
tion only in the judicial district in which such source is
located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not
a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(3) Protection of interests of United States. Whenever any ac-
tion is brought under this section in a court of the United
States, the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the complaint on
the Attorney General and the Administrator. No consent
judgment shall be entered in an action in which the United
States is not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt
of a copy of the proposed consent judgment by the Attorney
General and the Administrator.
(f) Effluent standard or limitation. For purposes of this section,
the term "effluent standard or limitation under this Act"
means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act under subsec-
tion (a) of section 301 of this Act [33 USCS § 1311(a)]; (2) an
effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301 or 302
of this Act [33 USCS § 1311 or 1312]; (3) standard of perform-
ance under section 306 of this Act [33 USCS § 1316]; (4) prohi-
bition, effluent standard or pretreatment standards under
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section 307 of this Act [33 USCS § 1317]; (5) certification under
section 401 of this Act [33 USCS § 1341]; (6) a permit or condi-
tion thereof issued under section 402 of this Act [33 USCS
§ 1342], which is in effect under this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et
seq.] (including a requirement applicable by reason of section
313 of this Act [33 USCS § 1323]); or (7) a regulation under
section 405(d) of this Act [33 USCS § 1315(d)] [,.
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40 C.F.R. § 122.21(c): (c) Time to apply. (1) Any person propos-
ing a new discharge, shall submit an application at least 180 days
before the date on which the discharge is to commence, unless per-
mission for a later date has been granted by the Director. Facili-
ties proposing a new discharge of storm water associated with
industrial activity shall submit an application 180 days before
that facility commences industrial activity which may result in a
discharge of storm water associated with that industrial activity.
Facilities described under § 122.26(b)(14)(x) or (b)(15)(i) shall sub-
mit applications at least 90 days before the date on which con-
struction is to commence. Different submittal dates may be
required under the terms of applicable general permits. Persons
proposing a new discharge are encouraged to submit their applica-
tions well in advance of the 90 or 180 day requirements to avoid
delay. See also paragraph (k) of this section and
§ 122.26(c)(1)(i)(G) and (c)(1)(ii).
40 C.F.R. § 122.2: Waters of the United States or waters of the
U.S. means:
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;"
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands,"
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would af-
fect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including
any such waters:
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign trav-
elers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold
in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by
industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of
the United States under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d)
of this definition;
(f) The territorial sea; and
.20051 577
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(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f)
of this definition.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3: (a) Violation of standard, limitation or order.
Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or
limitation or of an order with respect thereto, shall include suffi-
cient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the
activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons re-
sponsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged viola-
tion, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name,
address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.
(b) Failure to act. Notice regarding an alleged failure of the Ad-
ministrator to perform any act or duty under the Act which is not
discretionary with the Administrator shall identify the provision
of the Act which requires such act or creates such duty, shall de-
scribe with reasonable specificity the action taken or not taken by
the Administrator which is alleged to constitute a failure to per-
form such act or duty, and shall state the full name, address and
telephone number of the person giving the notice.
(c) Identification of counsel. The notice shall state the name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of the legal counsel, if any, repre-
senting the person giving the notice.
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APPENDIX C- Legislative Materials
123 Cong. Rec. S39211 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (statement of Sen.
Wallop), LEXIS 95 Cong. Senate Debates 1977, at *39211:
The conferees accepted an amendment which will reassure the
State [sic] that it is the policy of Congress that the Clean Water
Act will not be used for the purpose of interfering with State
water rights systems.
The amendment simply states that it is the policy of Congress
that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or oth-
erwise impaired by this act. It also states that it is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this act will be construed for
the purpose of superseding or abrogating rights to quantities of
water which have been established by a State.
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APPENDIX D- Internet Materials
Monitoring and Assessing Water Quality, EPA, at http://www.epa.
gov/volunteer/stream/ vms58.html (Sept. 9, 2003):
5.8 TOTAL SOLIDS
What are total solids and why are they important?
Total solids are dissolved solids plus suspended and settleable
solids in water. In stream water, dissolved solids consist of cal-
cium, chlorides, nitrate, phosphorus, iron, sulfur, and other ions
particles that will pass through a filter with pores of around 2 mi-
crons (0.002 cm) in size. Suspended solids include silt and clay
particles, plankton, algae, fine organic debris, and other particu-
late matter. These are particles that will not pass through a 2-
micron filter.
The concentration of total dissolved solids affects the water bal-
ance in the cells of aquatic organisms. An organism placed in
water with a very low level of solids, such as distilled water, will
swell up because water will tend to move into its cells, which have
a higher concentration of solids. An organism placed in water with
a high concentration of solids will shrink somewhat because the
water in its cells will tend to move out. This will in turn affect the
organism's ability to maintain the proper cell density, making it
difficult to keep its position in the water column. It might float up
or sink down to a depth to which it is not adapted, and it might
not survive.
Higher concentrations of suspended solids can serve as carriers of
toxics, which readily cling to suspended particles. This is particu-
larly a concern where pesticides are being used on irrigated crops.
Where solids are high, pesticide concentrations may increase well
beyond those of the original application as the irrigation water
travels down irrigation ditches. Higher levels of solids can also
clog irrigation devices and might become so high that irrigated
plant roots will lose water rather than gain it.
A high concentration of total solids will make drinking water un-
palatable and might have an adverse effect on people who are not
used to drinking such water. Levels of total solids that are too
high or too low can also reduce the efficiency of wastewater treat-
ment plants, as well as the operation of industrial processes that
use raw water.
Total solids also affect water clarity. Higher solids decrease the
passage of light through water, thereby slowing photosynthesis by
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aquatic plants. Water will heat up more rapidly and hold more
heat; this, in turn, might adversely affect aquatic life that has
adapted to a lower temperature regime.
Sources of total solids include industrial discharges, sewage, fer-
tilizers, road runoff, and soil erosion.
Total solids are measured in milligrams per liter (mg/L).
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